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Measuring What Employers Really Do about Entry Wages 
over the Business Cycle
* 
 
In models recently published by several influential macroeconomic theorists, rigidity in the 
real wages that firms pay newly hired workers plays a crucial role in generating realistically 
large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment. There is remarkably little evidence, however, on 
whether employers’ hiring wages really are invariant to business cycle conditions. We review 
the small empirical literature and show that the methods used thus far are poorly suited for 
identifying employers’ wage practices. We propose a simpler and more relevant approach – 
use matched employer/employee longitudinal data to identify entry jobs and then directly 
track the cyclical variation in the real wages paid to workers newly hired into those jobs. We 
illustrate the methodology by applying it to data from an annual census of employers in 
Portugal over the period 1982-2007. We find that real entry wages in Portugal over this 
period tend to be about 1.8 percent higher when the unemployment rate is one percentage 
point lower. Like most recent evidence on other aspects of wage cyclicality, our results 
suggest that the cyclical elasticity of wages is similar to that of employment. 
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I.  Introduction 
  Recent theoretical efforts to explain the amplitude of cyclical unemployment 
fluctuations have emphasized the potential importance of rigidity in the real wages that 
firms pay to their newly hired workers.  But are firms’ hiring wages really acyclical? 
  In section II, we review the recent theoretical literature.  In section III, we argue 
that the empirical literature has not succeeded yet in identifying what employers really do 
about hiring wages, and then we  propose a more direct and transparent empirical 
approach – using matched employer/employee longitudinal data to identify firms’ entry 
jobs and then tracking the cyclical variation in the real wages paid to workers newly hired 
into those jobs.  In section IV, we illustrate our approach with an application to data from 
the annual census of employers in Portugal.  In section V, we briefly summarize our 
findings, and we discuss their macroeconomic implications.    
 
II.  The Macroeconomic Importance of Entry-Wage Cyclicality 
At least since Keynes (1936), macroeconomists have theorized that wages are 
inflexible and that limited cyclical variability of wages may account for the cyclical 
volatility of employment and unemployment.  The idea continues to figure prominently 
in the current literature.  For example, the very first sentence of the recent Journal of 
Political Economy paper by Gertler and Trigari (2009, p. 38) says, “A long-standing 
challenge in macroeconomics is accounting for the relatively smooth behavior of real 
wages over the business cycle along with the relatively volatile behavior of employment.”   2 
Much of the current interest in the cyclical behavior of wages, especially hiring 
wages, has grown out of a debate about the ability of the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides 
(1994) model to generate realistically large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment.  In the 
canonical model, wages within a worker/employer  match are determined by Nash 
bargaining, and this yields a solution where the wage depends on the worker’s 
productivity in the match and the worker’s outside option, which depends in turn on the 
value of search and non-market activities.  Because the value of non-market activities is 
less cyclical than labor productivity, the wage does not vary as much as productivity, and 
employment is correspondingly more volatile.   However, as pointed out by Shimer 
(2005), under standard parameter values, the outside option is almost as cyclical as 
productivity, with the implication that wages in the canonical model are likewise too 
cyclical to generate realistic levels of unemployment variability.  
Consequently, several authors – such as Shimer (2004), Hall (2005), Hall and 
Milgrom (2008), Gertler and Trigari (2009), and Kennan (forthcoming) – have suggested 
wage stickiness as one way of generating more variability of unemployment within the 
model.  Whether this is the right way to go, however, should ultimately be subject to 
empirical investigation.  How much do wages actually vary over the business cycle? 
 Of course, there already is a great deal of evidence on certain aspects of that 
question.  Numerous studies using longitudinal microdata have found that real wages are 
substantially procyclical. As will be discussed in the next section, many of those studies   3 
find particularly large wage cyclicality for job changers, with lesser (though 
considerable) cyclicality appearing for the wages of workers in ongoing matches.
1
This apparent difference in wage cyclicality between incumbent and newly hired 
workers seems at odds with the canonical model, in which continuous Nash bargaining 
would cause wages in ongoing matches to be as procyclical as those in new matches.  
This is easily accommodated, though, by a sensible modification of the model.  All that 
matters for the job creation incentive (what determines how many new jobs there are) is 
the expected (discounted) value of wages in the match, not how they are distributed over 
time, a point that has long been recognized (Becker, 1962; Barro, 1977; Hall, 1980; and 
Boldrin and Horvath, 1995) and has been reemphasized in the context of the current 
debate (Shimer, 2004;  Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens, 2008;  and Pissarides,  2009).  
Hence, it is argued, all that is needed to square the model with the data is to incorporate a 
labor contract that  makes ongoing wages relatively insensitive to future productivity 
changes, for example, by making workers slightly risk averse while maintaining the 
canonical model’s assumption that firms are risk neutral.  In such an environment, if both 
firm and worker could commit to a future wage path, ongoing wages would be constant 
but at a level influenced by productivity at the point of match initiation, so wages of new 
hires could vary procyclically while those of “stayers” would be acyclical.  An approach 
along these lines then suggests that the wage in a new match would be persistent and the 
total cost of the worker – and hence the profitability of the match – would vary with the 
start wage. 
 
                                                 
1 See Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) and the literature review in Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1992).  For 
more recent studies focusing on wage cyclicality in ongoing matches, see Devereux (2001), Devereux and  
Hart (2006), and Shin and Solon (2007).   4 
In fact this goes too far to the other extreme as now stayers’ wages are too rigid 
relative to the data.  Rudanko (2009) incorporates Thomas and Worrall’s (1988) model of 
“limited commitment” into a search-matching model, so that ongoing wages respond to 
compete with  outside options and therefore display  a degree of procyclicality.    For 
example, Rudanko finds that, if neither firm nor worker can commit irreversibly to a 
future wage path, then the model can match the empirical aggregate wage volatility (and 
while she does not examine this, the continuing match wage will also be procyclical).  
However,  the effect on magnifying unemployment and vacancy volatility is small  – 
essentially confirming the point that the distribution of wages over time in an ongoing 
match is unimportant. 
This issue is considered further by Kudlyak (2007), who compares the cyclicality 
of the new hire wage with that of the “user cost of labor.”  The latter is defined to 
measure the cost of hiring a worker today relative to postponing this decision one period, 
and is the primary determinant of the current employment decision (as, in the equilibrium 
of her matching model, the marginal product of labor will equal the user cost).  If a 
worker hired next period will be paid differently from a hire today, the user cost must 
take into account this future difference in addition to the current wage.  Kudylak 
emphasizes that the user cost may be even more procyclical than the new hire wage.  To 
understand this, consider a worker hired in a downturn, and suppose full commitment by 
both worker and firm is possible.  The equilibrium contract will pay a relatively low and 
constant wage.  However,  because of mean reversion, productivity is expected to 
improve, so a worker hired next period is likely to receive a higher constant wage.  Thus 
the cost of filling a position today rather than tomorrow is the current wage less the   5 
discounted future expected savings on the lower wage contract, and the user cost falls 
more than the new hire wage in a recession (and vice versa in a boom).  Even when 
commitment is imperfect, a similar argument may apply if wages in ongoing matches are 
sufficiently inertial relative to productivity.
2
To summarize, even if wages in ongoing employment relationships were sticky, 
the wages of new hires could be highly procyclical, and the allocative importance of start 
wages is all the greater the more persistent those wages are as the match continues.  As 
recent theoretical analyses have shown, with sufficiently procyclical start wages, the 
problem of explaining the volatility of unemployment remains.  But are entry wages 
really very procyclical?  In the next section, we explain why existing evidence is not 
dispositive, and we introduce a more direct approach for measuring entry-wage 
cyclicality.   
  
 
III.  Methods of Measuring Entry-Wage Cyclicality 
A.  Previous Empirical Studies 
  Pissarides (2009) dismisses theories based on cyclically rigid wages on the 
ground that, empirically, hiring wages are quite procyclical.  His main basis for the claim 
is a collection of microeconometric studies reporting that workers who change employers 
during expansions tend to experience much better wage growth than workers who change 
employers during recessions.  Examples of such studies include Bils (1985) and Shin 
                                                 
2 Kudlyak (2009) makes a heroic attempt to measure the cyclicality in the user cost of newly hired labor.  
The true value of that user cost as perceived by the employer depends on how long the employer believes 
the match will last, what the employer believes will be the future path of both the wage rate and the 
productivity of the match, and the employer’s understanding of the interrelationships among these factors.  
For a data analyst to impute the employer’s perception of the user cost therefore requires very strong 
assumptions.  Based on the assumptions she makes, Kudlyak concludes that the user cost is more 
procyclical than the start wage.   6 
(1994) for the United States; Devereux and Hart (2006) for the United Kingdom; and 
Martins (2007) and Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal (2009) for Portugal.  Similarly, 
Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2008) find that individuals moving from non-
employment to employment during expansions tend to receive higher  wages than 
individuals moving from non-employment to employment during recessions. 
  Gertler and Trigari (2009), however, explain why such evidence does not rule out 
acyclical wage setting by firms.  Even if every firm maintains cyclically rigid wages in 
each job title, workers taking new jobs will show procyclical wages if, during expansions, 
they face better opportunities to move into higher-paying industries, higher-paying firms 
within industries, or higher-paying jobs within firms.  In contrast, during recessions, a 
larger share of job changers are displaced workers, who often suffer wage reductions 
relative to the jobs they have lost.  As Gertler and Trigari (p. 73) put it, “Suppose, for 
example, that a highly skilled machinist takes a job as a low-paid  cab driver in a 
recession and then is re-employed as a high-paid machinist in a boom.  In this case there 
is a cyclical movement in job match quality for the individual” even if the wages in both 
the machinist job and the cab driver job are acyclical.
3
  We should note that, from the workers’ perspective, their improved opportunities 
for moving to better jobs in an expansion are a true form of wage procyclicality.  But that 
  As Gertler and Trigari emphasize, 
this process of so-called “cyclical upgrading” in worker/employer matches (and cyclical 
downgrading in recessions) has long been discussed and documented.  Early references 
include Reynolds (1951), Reder (1955), and Okun (1973).  Recent analyses include 
Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997), McLaughlin and Bils (2001), and Devereux (2004). 
                                                 
3 Bewley (1999, p. 151) earlier made the exact same point: “the findings could result from the effects of 
recession on the level of jobs accepted during recessions rather than from the effects on hiring pay for 
particular jobs.”   7 
is not what theoretical analyses such as Hall (2005) are about.  Rather, those analyses are 
attempting to explain  the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations in unemployment by 
assuming rigidity in the hiring wages that particular firms pay in particular jobs.  Gertler 
and Trigari therefore are correct in criticizing the existing empirical literature for 
rejecting such  theories on the basis of evidence confounded by cyclical 
upgrading/downgrading.   
Gertler and Trigari claim to get better estimates of cyclicality of hiring wages 
within particular jobs by using longitudinal U.S. worker data from 1990-1996 in the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation.  In particular, they perform least squares 
estimation of a regression of the worker’s log real wage on the unemployment rate, the 
interaction of the unemployment rate with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the worker 
has been with the current employer for less than a year, dummy variables for every 
worker/employer match, and other control variables including the current tenure of the 
match.  The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is statistically insignificant, and 
Gertler and Trigari (pp. 73-4) conclude that, “after we control for compositional effects, 
new hire wages appear no more cyclically sensitive than existing workers’ wages.” 
  It is crucial, however, to consider  the properties of the sort of “fixed effects 
estimation”  that Gertler and Trigari  implement by controlling for worker/employer 
matches.  As is well-known from the literature on longitudinal estimation, controlling for 
match-specific fixed effects is the same thing as using only the within-match variation in 
the other regressors to identify the coefficients of those regressors.
4
                                                 
4 For example, see Wooldridge (2002, p. 273). 
  As a result, what 
Gertler and Trigari’s insignificant estimate for the coefficient of the interaction term 
really means is  merely this –  when one contrasts how a worker’s wage moves  with   8 
changes in the unemployment rate during the first year with an employer (say, between 
the worker’s second and sixth months with the employer) with how the same worker’s 
wage moves with changes in the unemployment rate after the first year with the employer 
(say, between the fourteenth and eighteenth months of the match), the estimate of this 
contrast is statistically insignificant.  As such, the estimated coefficient of the interaction 
term speaks only to a particular aspect of how workers’ wages evolve after the workers 
already have been hired.  It does not measure cyclicality in initial hiring wages.
5
  To summarize, we agree with Gertler and Trigari’s point that empirical 
assessment of recent theories of hiring-wage rigidity requires an approach that identifies 
cyclical variation in hiring wages within particular jobs.  Their approach, however, does 
not achieve this.  In the next sub-section, we propose an alternative approach that does 
track hiring wages in particular jobs.  
 
 
B.  Our Methodology 
  To get at the question that recent researchers intended to address, we propose a 
more direct and pertinent methodology – identify specific entry jobs within particular 
                                                 
5 Where Gertler and Trigari control for match fixed effects, Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal (2009) 
(using the same Portuguese data base that we use) instead control for linearly separable worker fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects.  Like the fixed effects estimation of Gertler and Trigari, the fixed effects 
estimation of Carneiro et al. does not seem to identify what the authors intend it to.  First, controlling for 
linearly additive firm effects does not account for within-firm heterogeneity in match quality.  Taking 
Gertler and Trigari’s skilled machinist as an example, controlling for firm fixed effects successfully adjusts 
for that worker’s cyclical upgrading only if the only reason the machinist is paid more by the firm that uses 
him as a machinist than the firm that uses him as a cab driver is that the first firm tends to pay all its 
workers more than the latter firm pays all its workers.  Obviously, that need not be the case.  Second, the 
particular regression model estimated by Carneiro et al. includes a dummy variable for matches in their first 
year (which switches off after the first year of the match) and an interaction of that dummy with the 
unemployment rate.  The sum of the coefficient of the interaction term and the coefficient of the 
unemployment rate is taken to represent the overall cyclicality of hiring wages.  Carneiro et al., however, 
do not justify that interpretation and, in certain cases, it clearly is incorrect.  As a particularly simple 
example, consider the “full commitment” case in which a worker hired at a low wage during a recession is 
thereby locked into a low wage throughout the rest of the match.  With identification coming off of the 
contrast between the first year and subsequent years of the match, this observation would bias the 
estimation away from finding a recession effect on the hiring wage.          9 
firms, track the wages paid to newly hired workers in those jobs, and measure how those 
entry wages vary over the business cycle.  A precedent for this approach was applied by 
Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997, p. 412), who found that “the entry wage for 
‘laborers,’ the most common occupation for newly hired workers” in the Byers iron 
tubing and pipe manufacturing company, was procyclical over the 1919-1932 period.  
That result, however, applied to only one company observed over 70 years ago.  In the 
present paper, we take a similar approach with a large number of firms observed between 
1982 and 2007 in an annual census of employers in Portugal.  Because we hope that our 
approach eventually will be applied to other countries besides Portugal, here we describe 
the general methodology.  Idiosyncrasies that arise in the application to the Portuguese 
data set will be addressed in section IV. 
  Let  jt w  denote the typical real wage paid in period t to workers newly hired into 
job j , which is a particular job into which a particular firm does a substantial amount of 
its hiring of new employees.  A convenient statistical model for  jt w  is 
(1)  jt t j jt w ε β α + + = log  
where  j α  is a job fixed effect,  t β  is a period fixed effect common to all entry jobs, and 
the zero-mean error term  jt ε   represents  temporary  job-specific departures  from the 
general period effect.  The object of our analysis is to estimate a time series for  t β  and 
relate it to business cycle conditions. 
  If the data set were a “balanced panel” with every one of the N sampled jobs 
observed in all periods, the estimation of  t β  would be particularly simple.  With the 






jt t N w
1
/ log ˆ β . 
A figure that plotted the  t β ˆ   time series along with a cycle indicator such as the 
unemployment rate would give an eyeball impression of the cyclical behavior of entry 
wages.  A quantitative summary could be obtained by applying least squares to the 
regression of  t β ˆ  on the unemployment rate with controls for secular time trends.  If non-
stationarity were a concern, the regression could be estimated in first differences instead 
of levels. 
  If the panel is unbalanced because observations of  jt w  are missing for some jobs 
in some years, it is still straightforward to estimate  t β  in equation (1) by applying least 
squares to the regression of the available observations of  jt w log  on a vector of period 
dummy variables (for which the estimated coefficients are the  t β ˆ  series) and a vector of 
job dummies.  Alternatively, exactly the same  t β ˆ  are obtained by applying least squares 
to the “de-meaned” regression of  jt w log  on a vector of period dummies, in which each 
variable is expressed as a deviation from the job’s time mean of the variable over the 
periods in which that job is observed.  Either way of calculating  t β ˆ  accounts for period-
to-period changes in which jobs are in the sample by controlling for job fixed effects.  
This  t β ˆ   series is the same as the sample means in equation (2) except that it is 
regression-adjusted for changes in sample composition.  Again, the  t β ˆ  series can be 
plotted along with the unemployment rate, and it can be regressed on the unemployment 
rate and time trend variables.   11 
   Although complications inevitably arise in practice (as will be seen in the next 
section), the basic methodology is almost absurdly simple.  That is what we like about it.  
Our method looks in a direct and transparent way at what employers actually do about 
entry wages over the business cycle.  
 
IV.  An Application to Firm-Level Data from Portugal 
A.  Description of the data 
  In this section, we illustrate our method for measuring entry-wage cyclicality with 
an application to Portuguese data from 1982-2007.  As shown in figure 1, Portugal’s 
annual unemployment rate varied widely over that period, with peaks in the mid 1980’s, 
mid 1990’s, and mid 2000’s.  Another relevant feature of the Portuguese labor market 
over that period is its system of collective wage bargaining, which is explained in detail 
in Cardoso and Portugal (2005).  The main message of that paper is that the bargained 
wage rates function as wage floors, with employers commonly paying wages above those 
floors.  In the authors’ words (p. 899), “the wage cushion works as a mechanism to 
overcome the constraints imposed by collective bargaining, allowing firms wide scope 
for action in their wage-setting policy….  This operation of institutional forces and 
market forces in the Portuguese economy may help explain why a typically European 
institutional framework is compatible with high wage flexibility and low 
unemployment.” 
  Our data come from Quadros de Pessoal, an annual mandatory census of all 
employers in Portugal (except that most of the public sector is excluded).  The census 
was conducted in March in each year through 1993 and in October from 1994 on.    12 
Employer identification numbers enable longitudinal matching of employers.  
Information on every individual employed by the firm as of the census date is available 
for every year between 1982 and 2007 except 1990 and 2001.  The employee information 
includes  wage rate, detailed occupation  code, and tenure with the firm.  Employee 
identification numbers enable longitudinal matching of individual workers, even when 
they change employers, from 1986 on. 
  The data base suits our purposes very well.  The combination of occupation and 
tenure information enables us to identify jobs into which each firm commonly recruits 
new employees, and we also observe the wages that the new employees in those jobs are 
paid.  And by tracking those entry-job wages longitudinally, we can observe how they 
vary over the business cycle. 
  To identify a set of jobs into which, year after year, employers are observed to 
hire new workers, we apply a series of sample selection criteria.  First, we consider only 
firms that employed at least 50 workers in at least five years of the 1982-2007 period.  
Second, we define jobs within firms in terms of five-digit occupation codes (such as 
supermarket shelf stocker, bank teller, clothing machine operator).  When the same 
occupation code appears for different firms, we treat each occurrence as a different 
occupation/firm job.  We link the occupation codes used from 1995 on with a different 
system of codes used through 1994, but, in the process, we lose some jobs for which the 
pre-1995 codes branch out into multiple post-1995 codes.
6
                                                 
6 We also check that all workers in the job are at the same “job level,” an eight-category variable coded as 
(1) apprentices, interns, trainees; (2) non-skilled professionals; (3) semi-skilled professionals; … (8) top 
executives (top management).  In most cases, this check is superfluous because it is unusual for the workers 
listed in the same occupation code within a firm to span more than one job level. 
  Third, defining newly hired 
workers as those with no more than four months of tenure, we include a job in our main   13 
sample of entry jobs if, in at least half the years the firm is present in the data base, the 
particular job accounted for at least three new hires and at least 10 percent of the firm’s 
new hires in that year. 
  We therefore are focusing on what Doeringer and Piore (1971) called “port-of-
entry” jobs.  We do not mean, however, to subscribe to their stark description in which 
firms hire into only a limited number of such jobs, with other jobs filled almost 
exclusively by internal promotions and reassignments.  More recent studies – such as the 
case study of a particular firm by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) – have suggested 
that hiring from outside a firm can take place in a broad spectrum of jobs.  Our focus on 
jobs that recurrently show new hires in the annual employer census is driven mainly by a 
pragmatic concern – to identify cyclical variation in hiring wages by job, we need those 
wages to be observed in multiple years spanning different business cycle conditions.   
The main sample resulting from our selection criteria consists of 1,159 jobs in 998 
firms.  The firms are spread across a wide variety of industries, with the most common 
being manufacturing, construction,  retail trade, hotels and restaurants,  education,  and 
“other business activities” (including cleaning, security, and temporary work agencies).  
Our panel of wages in entry jobs is “unbalanced,” with a total of 8,804 job/years.  The 
unbalancedness occurs because some firms begin or end between 1982 and 2007; 
because, in existing firms, it may happen that the workers observed in the job as of a 
particular census month include no one hired within the last four months; and because, as 
explained below, we sometimes are unable to identify a modal hiring wage.   14 
Table 1 displays sample size statistics by year along with the seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate for the census month.
7  The number of entry-job wages observed per 
year ranges from a low of 136 in 1982 to a high of 675 in 2003.  With a total of 280,814 
newly hired workers observed in the 8,804 job/years, on average more than 30 newly 
hired workers are observed per job/year.  On account of procyclical hiring, the number of 
newly hired workers per observed entry job shows a clear tendency to be lower in years 
of high unemployment.  Importantly, however, there is not a clear tendency for the 
number of observed entry jobs to decline in those years.  If there were, we would need to 
worry that rigidity in hiring wages in some firms might be causing those firms to 
disappear from our sample in recession years because their hiring into their entry jobs 
dropped to zero.  Instead, the pattern is that hiring declines but remains positive, so that 
we still observe hiring wages.
8
  Obviously, our analysis pertains to only a small fraction of all the jobs and firms 
encompassed in the Portuguese census of employers.  It does, however, focus on those 
jobs that are most clearly recognizable as perennial entry jobs.  Perhaps it is best to view 
our study as a sort of summary of 1,159 case studies of particular entry jobs. 
 
  As explained in the previous section, the dependent variable in our first-stage 
regressions is the typical logarithmic real hiring wage in job j in period t.  The wage 
measure we start with is each newly hired worker’s monthly base pay (“corresponding to 
the normal hours of work”) divided by the worker’s normal monthly hours.  We use 
                                                 
7 These are the Eurostat unemployment rates reported at 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=132.STS.M.PT.S.UNEH.RTT000.4.000 as of June 
2009.   As these go back only to 1983, for March 1982 we use the first-quarter unemployment rate from 
Statistics Portugal. 
8 We thank David Card, Jonathan Guryan, and Steven Rivkin for raising this issue at the NBER Summer 
Institute.  Note that, if we treated workers rather than jobs as our unit of analysis, variation in the number of 
hires per job could cause problems of endogenous sample selection.   15 
Statistics Portugal’s monthly consumer price index (for March through 1993, for October 
afterwards) to convert this wage to real terms.  Our main measure of the typical log hiring 
wage in a job/year is the modal value (with log wages measured to two decimal places).  
As mentioned above, we have dropped job/years in which we did not identify a modal 
wage.  This occurred because of ties, most often because the job/year contained only two 
newly hired workers who received different wages.  Figure 2 displays, for the 280,814 
newly hired workers in our sample, the histogram of the difference between the worker’s 
log wage and the modal log hiring wage in the job/year.  As the figure shows, typically 
most of the newly hired workers in a job/year are paid at the modal rate. 
  
B.  Empirical Analysis 
  As explained  in section III.B,  we begin by estimating the year  effects  t β   in 
equation (1) by applying least squares to the regression of the logarithm of job-specific 
real entry wages  jt w  on year dummy variables with controls for job fixed effects.  As 
discussed in section III.B, if the panel of entry jobs were balanced with entry wages 






jt t N w
1
/ log ˆ β .  With  our highly unbalanced panel, our estimates essentially 
regression-adjust that simple statistic for year-to-year changes in sample composition. 
  The resulting  t β ˆ  series is plotted in figure 3, with the value for 1982 normalized 
to zero.  Recall from section IV.A that the series pertains to March for the observations 
from 1982 through 1993, it pertains to October for the observations from 1994 through 
2007, and it is missing the years 1990 and 2001.  The figure also displays the seasonally   16 
adjusted unemployment rates for the corresponding months.  Eyeballing the figure in a 
way that takes account of the upward secular trend in wages gives the impression that the 
entry-wage  series  and the unemployment rate  are inversely related, but that the 
relationship is very loose. 
  As discussed in section III.B, we can quantify the cyclicality of entry wages by 
estimating regressions of the  t β ˆ  time series on the unemployment rate and secular time 
trend controls.  The first row of table 2  shows the estimated coefficient of the 
unemployment rate when this regression controls for a linear time trend and is estimated 
by weighted least squares (weighting by the number of entry jobs observed per year, in an 
effort to correct for the heteroskedasticity resulting from the wide variation in the per-
year sample size).  The procyclical coefficient estimate of -1.79 (with estimated standard 
error 0.39)
9
  Heteroskedasticity diagnostics applied to the residuals suggest that the weighting 
procedure is reasonable, but in the next row of table 2 we use ordinary least squares 
instead of weighted least squares.  The resulting coefficient estimate, -1.66  (with 
estimated standard error 0.49), is close to the weighted result.  In the third row, we apply 
ordinary least squares to the first-differenced version of the regression.  A linear time 
trend in levels implies that, in first differences, we need to control for the varying time 
interval between adjacent observations, which is usually 12 months but is 24 months for 
  implies that, when the unemployment rate is one point higher (say, .07 
instead of .06), real entry wages tend to be about 1.8 percent lower. 
                                                 
9 The reported standard error estimates are the old-fashioned kind, i.e., not corrected for heteroskedasticity 
or serial correlation.  Serial correlation diagnostics indicate a first-order autocorrelation of about 0.4 and 
negligible second- and third-order autocorrelations.  Despite having only 24 time series observations in our 
second-stage regressions, we have experimented with Newey-West standard error estimation robust to 
heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation.  The resulting standard error estimates are very close to 
the old-fashioned ones.   17 
the 1989-1991 and 2000-2002 changes and 19 months for the change from March 1993 to 
October 1994.  The resulting estimate, -1.88 (0.89), is a little more procyclical than the 
previous estimates. 
  In the fourth row, we revert to the analysis in the first row except that, as a simple 
check for dynamics, we include the 12-month lag of the unemployment rate as an 
additional regressor.
10
  In the fifth row, we redo the regression from row 1 except that we control for a 
quadratic time trend.  The estimated coefficient of the squared trend variable is 
statistically insignificant, and the estimated coefficient of the unemployment rate, -1.54 
(0.54), becomes a little less procyclical. 
  The estimated coefficient of the lagged term, -0.15 (0.78), is small 
and statistically insignificant, and the estimated coefficient of the contemporaneous term, 
-1.84 (0.73), is significantly procyclical.  Combining the estimates, the implied wage 
response to a one-point increase in the unemployment rate in both periods is -1.99. 
  The next five rows repeat the analysis from row 1 but with alternative approaches 
to the first-stage estimation of the  t β ˆ  series.  In the sixth row, instead of representing the 
“typical” job/year wage  jt w  with the modal wage of new hires, we use their average 
wage.  In the second-stage regression, this results in a slightly more procyclical estimate 
of -1.83 (0.46).  This analysis still uses the individual wage measure described in section 
IV.A – the worker’s monthly base pay (“corresponding to the normal hours of work”) 
divided by the worker’s normal monthly hours.  In the seventh and eighth rows, we use 
alternative wage measures.  In the seventh row, we use the average of a wage measure 
                                                 
10 The analysis of Portuguese wage cyclicality in Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal (2009) uses only a 
one-year lag of the unemployment rate and does not report results for the contemporaneous unemployment 
rate.   18 
that adds in supplements “with a regular monthly nature, on account of subsistence, job 
transport, tenured-related or productivity, punctuality, hard-working/dangerous or dirty 
tasks, night shifts.”  In the eighth row, we go further by measuring the worker’s wage as 
the ratio of all the worker’s pay in the census month (including overtime, bonuses, etc.) to 
all the worker’s hours in the census month.  The estimates based on these alternative 
wage measures, -1.89 (0.46) and -1.79 (0.51), are similar to those using our original base 
pay measure. 
In the ninth row, we revert to using modal base pay, but we use a more inclusive 
sample of entry jobs in the first stage.  Instead of requiring that the firms employ at least 
50 workers in at least five years, we require that they employ at least 25.  And instead of 
requiring that the job involves at least three new hires and at least 10 percent of the firm’s 
new hires in at least half the years the firm is in the data base, we require at least two new 
hires and at least 10 percent of the firm’s new hires in at least a quarter of the years.  In 
the second stage, this results in a slightly more procyclical estimate of -1.89 (0.39).  In 
the tenth row, we repeat the analysis in the first row except that we define newly hired 
workers as those with tenure of no more than three months instead of four.  The resulting 
estimate, -1.80 (0.41), is almost identical to the one based on the four-month threshold. 
  Finally, because some analyses later in this section will involve only the years 
1986-2007, in the last row we redo the analysis of row 1 with only those years.  The 
resulting coefficient estimate, -1.61 (0.37), is a little less procyclical. 
  In general, throughout table 2, the estimated coefficients of the unemployment 
rate stay fairly close to -1.8.  Recognizing that, with procyclical labor force participation, 
the  negative of the change in the unemployment rate is an  attenuated version of   19 
proportional changes in employment, these estimates imply that the cyclical elasticity of 
entry wages and the cyclical elasticity of employment are of similar magnitudes.
11  In 
that sense, our estimates of the procyclicality of entry wages are substantial.  The result 
becomes more striking when one considers that the “cyclical upgrading” discussed in 
section III.A suggests that we may be underestimating the true procyclicality of entry 
wages.  If, in a recession, employers are able to recruit a higher quality of workers at any 
given wage, the effective wage they pay per efficiency unit of labor is that much lower.
12
  Another perspective on the estimates is that they are similar to the estimates of the 
overall cyclicality of workers’ real wages in the U.S. literature that uses longitudinal data 
to relate workers’ year-to-year changes in log wages to changes in the unemployment 
rate.
  
In section V, we will discuss further the macroeconomic implications of the magnitude of 
our estimates. 
13
                                                 
11 We have estimated Okun’s Law-style regressions for Portugal over our sample period and found that a 
one-point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 1.75 percent reduction in the 
employment/population ratio.  This procyclicality of employment is almost identical to the procyclicality 
we have estimated for real entry wages. 
  This similarity is surprising for two reasons.  First, the estimates are for different 
countries.  Second, they are measuring different facets of wage cyclicality.  As discussed 
in section II, wage smoothing in long-term employment relationships could cause overall 
wages to be less procyclical than the hiring wages in entry jobs.  On the other hand, as 
discussed in section III.A, workers’ procyclical opportunities to move to higher-paying 
jobs (both within and across firms) contribute to estimates of workers’ overall wage 
12 So far, our only empirical exploration of this possibility with the Portuguese data has been to re-estimate 
some of the regressions in table 2 with average years of education of newly hired workers, instead of their 
log hiring wage, as the dependent variable.  In accordance with the cyclical upgrading story, these estimates 
do show countercyclicality in the education of new hires, but the statistical significance of the estimates is 
sensitive to the specification of secular trends.   
13 See Bils (1985), Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994), and the literature review in Solon, Barsky, and Parker 
(1992).   20 
procyclicality, while our estimates of entry-wage cyclicality are designed to hold jobs 
constant. 
  To address the first issue of between-country differences, in table 3  we use 
longitudinal worker data from the Portuguese census of employers to replicate the 
analyses in the U.S. longitudinal literature.  In the tradition of Bils (1985), we estimate 
the regression of workers’ year-to-year change in log real wages on change in the 
unemployment rate.  Following Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994), we break the 
estimation into two steps.  In the first stage, we apply ordinary  least squares to the 
regression of the worker’s change in log real wages on year dummy variables and change 
in the worker’s squared age, which belongs in the regression if the log wage/age profile is 
quadratic in levels.  In the second stage, much as in the third row of table 2, we apply 
ordinary least squares to the regression of the estimated year effects on change in the 
unemployment rate and the length of the time interval between the adjacent censuses.
14
  The resulting coefficient estimate for the unemployment rate, shown in the first 
row of table 3, is -1.47 (with estimated standard error 0.42).  This estimate is slightly less 
procyclical than the entry-wage counterpart for 1986-2007 shown in the last row of table 
2.  This suggests that, between the  two factors that cause wage cyclicality from the 
workers’ perspective to differ from cyclicality of job-specific entry wages, the wage-
smoothing factor is at least as important as the cyclical-upgrading factor.  The estimate of 
  
The estimates are based on the period 1986-2007  because worker identifiers are not 
available before 1986. 
                                                 
14 We apply ordinary instead of weighted least squares in the second stage for reasons discussed in Dickens 
(1990).  In our worker-level analysis, as opposed to the entry-job analysis in table 2, our first-stage 
estimation involves millions of observations.  As a result, sampling error in the estimated year effects is 
inconsequential, and the error term in the second-stage regression is dominated by unobserved time effects 
common to all workers.   21 
-1.47, which is based on both male and female workers, is similar to the estimates for 
male workers in the U.S. longitudinal literature and higher than those for female workers.  
Furthermore, it is based on the same measure of workers’ wages used in most of our 
entry-wage analyses – the ratio of the worker’s monthly base pay to the worker’s normal 
monthly hours.  This measure leaves out overtime pay and other such non-base payments, 
which typically are included in the wage measures used in the U.S. longitudinal literature.  
In the second row of table 3, as in the eighth row of table 2, we include such pay by 
measuring the wage as the ratio of the worker’s total monthly pay to the worker’s total 
monthly hours.  The resulting coefficient estimate for the unemployment rate, -1.72 
(0.41), is even more procyclical.  The substantial procyclicality of real wages in Portugal 
accords with the conclusion of Cardoso and Portugal (2005), mentioned at the beginning 
of section IV.A, that “wage cushions” above the wage floors prescribed in collective 
bargaining enable flexible wages in Portugal. 
  As discussed in sections II and III.A, the wage cyclicality literature based on 
longitudinal worker data has estimated particularly strong wage procyclicality for 
workers who change employers and more moderate procyclicality for workers who stay 
with the same employer.  In the third row of table 3, we redo the estimation in row 1 with 
a sample restricted to workers who change employers  between censuses.  As in the 
previous literature, we find particularly procyclical wages for changers, with an estimated 
unemployment rate coefficient of -2.64 (0.41).
15
                                                 
15 The closest counterpart to this estimate in the analysis of the 1986-2005 Portuguese data by Carneiro, 
Guimarães, and Portugal (2009) pertains to male “accessions,” i.e., men with employer tenure of less than a 
year (who may or may not have been employed with another firm a year earlier).  Carneiro et al. apply 
ordinary least squares in one stage to a levels regression of the worker’s log wage (deflated by a lagged 
version of the consumer price index) on the one-year lag of the unemployment rate, a quadratic in time, a 
quadratic in age, and controls for worker fixed effects.  The estimated coefficient of their unemployment 
  Of course, the wage procyclicality for   22 
workers who change employers is expected to exceed other measures of wage 
procyclicality  because, for this group of workers,  cyclical upgrading/downgrading  is 
especially salient and wage smoothing is not a factor. 
  In the last row of table 3, we redo the row 1 analysis for a sample restricted to 
workers who stay with the same employer from one census to the next.  In the first-stage 
regression, we control for changes in the squares of both age and tenure with employer.  
The second-stage estimate of the unemployment rate coefficient, -1.43 (0.44), is almost 
as procyclical as our estimate of overall wage cyclicality and somewhat less procyclical 
than most of our estimates of entry-wage cyclicality.
16  The former comparison is a little 
surprising because, in the  U.S. literature, the estimates of stayers’ wage cyclicality 
usually are noticeably less than the estimates of overall wage cyclicality.
17
  To summarize, longitudinal worker-based estimates of real wage cyclicality in 
Portugal are fairly similar to those in the U.S. literature, with the Portuguese estimates 
appearing a little more procyclical.  In Portugal, however, unlike the United States at 
present, it is possible to use detailed employer/employee longitudinal data to conduct a 
direct and transparent analysis of the cyclical behavior of wages paid to newly hired 
workers in a large number of entry jobs.  As discussed in section III, these data are better 
suited for assessing recent theories of firms’ practices vis-à-vis setting hiring wages.  Our 
  With respect 
to the latter comparison, the wage-smoothing factor for stayers may be partly offset by 
cyclical upgrading of stayers across jobs within firms. 
                                                                                                                                                 
variable is -2.73.  See our footnote 5 for a discussion of our concerns about the way in which Carneiro et al. 
pool their estimation of the cyclicality in accession wages with the cyclicality of other wages.    
16 In the study described in the preceding footnote, Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal (2009) also report 
results for male stayers, for whom the estimated coefficient of the one-year lag of the unemployment rate is 
-1.50.  
17 But some studies – such as Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) and Shin and Solon (2007) – report only 
moderate differences.   23 
analyses of the Portuguese data have produced a robust finding that real entry wages by 
job tend to be about 1.8 percent lower when the unemployment rate is one percentage 
point higher.  
 
V.  Summary and Discussion 
  Using longitudinally matched data from Portugal’s annual census of employers, 
we have tracked the cyclical behavior of the real wages paid to newly hired employees in 
over a thousand  jobs.  We hope that eventually our methodology will be applied to 
additional countries as the requisite data become available. 
Our estimates suggest that real entry wages in Portugal  tend to be about 1.8 
percent lower when the unemployment rate is one percentage point higher.  As noted in 
section IV.B, this procyclicality in entry wages is substantial in the sense that the cyclical 
elasticity of this price variable is of approximately the same magnitude as the cyclical 
elasticity of employment.  This finding, like practically all the longitudinal evidence on 
workers’ wage cyclicality, counters a view often stated by influential macroeconomists 
that wages are much less cyclical than employment and unemployment. 
  One reason this finding matters is that some recent (as discussed in section II) and 
older attempts at theoretically explaining large cyclical changes in unemployment have 
emphasized rigidity of wages.  Like most  recent studies of other aspects of wage 
cyclicality, our study of real entry wages in Portugal has found that wages are not rigid, 
but rather respond considerably to business cycle conditions.  Of course, this finding does 
not preclude that, in some sense, wages are “insufficiently” variable.  Pursuing that idea, 
however, will require not a theory of wage rigidity, but a theory of why wages are not   24 
even more variable than they are.
18
  Finally, returning to the question posed in section II, can the Mortensen-Pissarides 
model in particular account for the cyclical variability of unemployment in light of the 
magnitude of the entry-wage cyclicality that we have found?  As discussed in section II, 
the answer depends not only on the cyclicality in hiring wages, but also on the persistence 
of those wages as the worker/employer match continues.  At one extreme, if workers 
hired at a low wage during a recession are somehow locked into a permanent 
employment relationship at a perpetually low wage, the labor cost relevant to employers’ 
recruiting decisions could be as cyclical as, or even more cyclical than, the initial hiring 
wage.  At the other extreme, if the shortfall in hiring wages during a recession vaporizes 
soon  after the employment relationship is initiated  (either because the cheaply-hired 
workers quit or because retaining them requires substantial raises once the recession 
eases), cyclicality in the initial hiring wage might have only trivial impact on hiring 
decisions.  Thus, assessing the allocative importance of initial  hiring wages in the 
Mortensen-Pissarides  model (or, for that matter, any model that recognizes the 
prevalence of long-term employment relationships) will require a deeper understanding 
of the durability of employment relationships, the evolution of wages and productivity in 
  Putting the point another way, the very existence of 
large cyclical fluctuations in employment and unemployment indicates that wages do not 
vary enough to prevent those fluctuations.  The continuing challenge to macroeconomic 
theorists is to develop a logically coherent and empirically relevant explanation of why 
employment, unemployment, and wages vary over the business cycle in the ways that 
they actually do. 
                                                 
18 Hall and Milgrom (2008), Kennan (forthcoming), Snell and Thomas (forthcoming), and Perry and Solon 
(1985) are examples of steps in that direction.   25 
those relationships, and the dependence of both on current, past, and anticipated business 
cycle conditions.  The empirical literature pioneered by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), 
which is summarized in Thomas and Worrall (2007), has begun to explore these issues, 
and we believe further research in that area could be highly productive.   26 
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Figure 1.  Annual Unemployment Rates in Portugal, 1982-2007 
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Figure 2.  Sample Distribution of Difference between Individual Worker’s Log Wage 
and Modal Log Hiring Wage in Job/Year  
     33 
Figure 3.  Estimated Period Effects for Log Entry Wages in Available Months and 
Corresponding Unemployment Rates, March 1982-October 2007 
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Table 1.  Sample Sizes by Year 
Year  Number of Entry 
Jobs 




in Census Month 
1982  136  2,745  7.32 
1983  160  3,831  7.67 
1984  138  2,876  8.85 
1985  178  2,838  9.05 
1986  211  3,185  9.31 
1987  218  4,144  7.71 
1988  226  4,033  6.14 
1989  248  6,385  5.35 
1991  239  6,680  4.20 
1992  258  8,412  3.91 
1993  266  7,261  5.06 
1994  302  9,065  7.01 
1995  339  9,711  7.15 
1996  351  10,296  7.15 
1997  371  11,763  6.68 
1998  448  15,100  4.78 
1999  467  14,510  4.26 
2000  506  18,731  3.87 
2002  539  18,389  5.67 
2003  675  26,641  6.48 
2004  652  21,328  7.04 
2005  657  24,361  7.99 
2006  637  22,004  8.00 
2007  582  26,525  7.84 
Total  8,804  280,814     35 
Table 2.  Estimates of Cyclicality of Log Entry Wages in Portugal, 1982-2007 
Estimation Method  Estimated Coefficient of Unemployment 
Rate (and Estimated Standard Error) 
1.  Weighted least squares for regression of 
log modal entry wage year effects on 
unemployment rate and linear time trend 
-1.79 
(0.39) 
2.  Same as (1) but ordinary least squares  -1.66 
(0.49) 




4.  Same as (1) with one-year lag of 
unemployment rate as additional regressor 
Contemporaneous: -1.84 
(0.73) 
Lagged:                  -0.15 
(0.78) 
5.  Same as (1) with quadratic time trend  -1.54 
(0.54) 
6.  Same as (1) with log average wage  -1.83 
(0.46) 
7.  Same as (6) with wage measure 




8.  Same as (6) with wage measure 
including all non-base pay 
-1.79 
(0.51) 
9.  Same as (1) with more inclusive 
definition of entry jobs 
-1.89 
(0.39) 
10.  Same as (1) with new-hire criterion 
reduced to three months of tenure 
-1.80 
(0.41) 
11.  Same as (1) for 1986-2007  -1.61 
(0.37) 
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Table 3.  Estimates from Regressions of Portuguese Workers’ Change in Log Wages on 
Change in Unemployment Rate, 1986-1987 to 2006-2007 
 
Estimation Method  Estimated Coefficient of Change in 
Unemployment Rate (and Estimated 
Standard Error) 
1.  All longitudinally matched workers, 
with controls for age and time 
-1.47 
(0.42) 
2.  Same as (1) but with wage measure 
including non-base pay 
-1.72 
(0.41) 
3.  Same as (1) but for sample restricted to 
workers changing employers 
-2.64 
(0.41) 
4.  Same as (1) but for sample restricted to 
workers staying with same employer (with 
additional control for tenure with 
employer) 
-1.43 
(0.44) 
 
 
 